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FIRST AMENDMENT-FREE SPEECH
Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977).
In Wooley v. Maynard,' the Supreme Court
reviewed an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief brought in federal court by
George Maynard, 2 who was convicted 3 for cov-
ering the state motto on his license plate, in
violation of a New Hampshire statute.4 Mr.
Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, considered the
state motto, "Live Free or Die," repugnant to
his moral and religious beliefs.5 Appellee May-
nard was arrested and convicted three times
for his statutory violations.6 He did not seek a
state court review of his convictions 7 but served
out his fifteen day jail term. Upon discharge
from prison, Maynard filed suit in federal
court seeking equitable relief-specifically, to
prevent future arrests for obscuring the state
motto and to require issuance to him of license
plates not bearing the state motto.
Wooley presented the Supreme Court with
three issues: the proper jurisdictional forum
for the controversy, the legitimate scope of
federal equitable power and the resolution of a
conflict with the first amendment. The Court,
in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger,
held that despite appellees' failure to exhaust
their state appellate remedies, federal jurisdic-
tion was not precluded because appellees
sought wholly prospective relief.8 The Court
I Wooley v. Maynard, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977).
2 Mrs. Maynard was also a party to the action
since, as joint owner of the family cars, she is no less
likely to be subjected to state prosecution than her
husband. 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
3 He was arrested November 27, 1974, and given a
$25 suspended fine. He was arrested for the second
time on December 28, 1974, and given a 15 day jail
term, which he served. He was arrested for the third
time January 3, 1975. Maynard received no punish-
ment in addition to the 15 day jail term for his last
conviction. 97 S. Ct. at 1432.
4 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1973).
5 Mr. and Mrs. Maynard believe it would be con-
trary to Jehovah's Kingdom to serve up their lives
for the state. 97 S. Ct. at 1431 n.2.6 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1973).
7 Time for appeal from Maynard's convictions had
expired before Maynard filed the federal action.
Wooley v. Maynard, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 n.4
(D.N.H. 1976).8 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
also held that the district court's granting of
injunctive relief to the appellees was not error,
since the "exceptional circumstances" necessary
to invoke such a strong remedy were present. 9
Finally, in the constitutional realm, the Court
struck down the New Hampshire statute pro-
hibiting removal of the state motto from license
plates.10 The Court decided that the first
amendment prohibits a state from requiring
an individual to display ideological messages
on his private property "in a manner and for
the express purpose that [they] be observed
and read by the public.""l
JURISDICTION
The State of New Hampshire claimed the
district court was precluded from exercising
jurisdiction in the controversy because of the
Younger12 doctrine of "equitable restraint,"
which precludes the federal courts from inter-
vening in on-going state criminal proceedings.
Appellees in Younger v. Harris filed a complaint
in the federal district court seeking injunctive
relief against prosecution by the Los Angeles
district attorney in a pending state case. The
federal petition was filed after the state had
indicted appellee for violation of the state stat-
ute. The United States Supreme Court refused
to enjoin the district attorney in order to avoid
"violation of the national policy forbidding fed-
eral courts to stay or enjoin pending state court
proceedings except under special circum-
stances." 1
3
The Wooley Court noted, however, that
Younger principles cannot deny an individual
9 "To justify injunctive relief there must be excep-
tional circumstances and a clear showing that an
injuction is necessary in order to afford adequate
protection of constitutional rights." 97 S. Ct. at 1434
(quoting Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89,
95 (1935)).
10 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (1966) requires
every non-commercial car to bear a license embossed
with "Live Free or Die." Section 262:27-c (Supp.
1973) makes it a misdemeanor knowingly to obscure
the figures or letters on any number plate.
" 97 S. Ct. at 1435.
12 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-46 (1971).3Id. at41.
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resort to a federal forum when there is a
"genuine threat of prosecution" and there is
no pending state action on the controversy. 4
The requirement of a "genuine threat of pros-
ecution" was demonstrated in Steffel v. Thomp-
son,
15 a case cited in Wooleyt 6 as authority for
this issue. In that case, petitioner showed a
"genuine threat of prosecution" by establishing
a police intention to arrest him if he engaged
in pamphleteering. The Steffel Court recog-
nized that if there was a pending state criminal
proceeding, the federal plaintiff would still be
provided with a forum to vindicate his consti-
tutional rights, and therefore, the federal
courts would not intervene.'7 But if there were
no pending state proceeding, as was the case in
Steffel, the refusal of a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction would leave the plaintiff "between
the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law
and the Charybdis of foregoing what he be-
lieves to be constitutionally protected activity in
order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a crimi-
nal proceeding." 8
A fortiori, Mr. Maynard demonstrated a
"genuine threat of arrest." He had, unlike
petitioner in Steffel, already been arrested and
convicted three times for obscuring the state
motto, and there was no indication that arrests
would cease if he once again engaged in similar
activity. The Supreme Court in Wooley stated
that the Maynards were placed in the same
ideological/practical dilemma as petitioner in
Steffel, since there was no pending state action
to provide a forum for the Maynards' constitu-
tional claim.' 9 Thus, the Court concluded that
the district court had had jurisdiction to resolve
the dispute.
20
This part of the Wooley opinion is well-rea-
soned and supported by precedent. It seems
that the intention of the Steffel Court was to
provide a forum for federal claims when there
is no contemporary state action to resolve the
conflict. By serving his jail term and ignoring
state appellate review, Mr. Maynard had di-
vorced himself from the state judicial system.
Thus, if he was to obtain relief, his only option
was to petition the federal courts.
New Hampshire next attempted to establish
14 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
15 415 U.S. 452 (1975).
16 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
17 415 U.S. at 462.
18/d.
'9 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
20 Id.
Mr. Maynard's failure to appeal his state con-
viction as a basis for denial of federal jurisdic-
tion, citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.21 for the
proposition that "a necessary concomitant of
Younger is that a party in appellee's posture
must exhaust his state appellate remedies be-
fore seeking relief in District Court. ' 22 How-
ever, the Court noted that Huffman was fac-
tually inapposite and therefore not control-
ling.23 In Huffman, the petitioner wanted the
federal court to review the lower state court's
ruling. The district court's refusal to exercise
jurisdiction was upheld, because "[f]ederal
post-trial intervention, in a fashion designed to
annul the results of a state trial ... deprives
the State of a function which quite legitimately
is left to them, that of overseeing trial court
dispositions of constitutional issues which arise
in civil litigation over which they have jurisdic-
tion.' '2 4 Unlike the appellee in Huffman, Mr.
Maynard was not seeking to annul his lower
court convictions. 25 The relief he sought was
purely prospective -to preclude further prose-
cutions under a state statute Maynard thought
was unconstitutional.
The petitioner in Huffrman had been indicted
for a statutory violation, but he had not been
through the state trial proceeding. The Wooley
Court correctly recognized that the Maynards'
petition was not an attempt to prevent effectua-
tion of pending state court proceedings: the
New Hampshire court had already convicted
Maynard, and he had fully served his ap-
pointed sentence. A key phrase which limits
the applicability of Huffman is: "[A] party in
appellee's posture must exhaust his state appellate
remedies. ' 26 Since Maynard was not in the
same position as the appellee in Huffman, the
Court's refusal to require an exhaustion of
state court remedies for access to federal juris-
diction was principled.
EQUITABLE POWERS
After deciding that the federal courts had
jurisdiction, the Wooley Court discussed the
21 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
22 Id. at 608. This meant Younger standards had to
be met when there was no exhaustion of the state
court proceedings.
23 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
24 420 U.S. at 609.
25 He did not ask to have his record expunged,
nor did he ask for relief from a potential license
revocation. 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
26 420 U.S. at 608 (emphasis added).
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appropriate remedies available should the May-
nards prevail on the merits. Appellees sought
both declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of the New Hampshire statute.
The principle enunciated in Steffel, which per-
mits federal declaratory relief when there is no
pending state action but there is a "genuine
threat of prosecution," vested the Wooley Court
with authority to grant the Maynards' prayer
for declaratory relief without further extension
of existing precedent. However, the "stronger
injunctive medicine" is not usually granted to
enjoin enforcement of state criminal statutes.2 7
In fact, the Court in Spielman Motor Co. v.
Dodge, a case in which petitioner brought suit
to restrain the District Attorney of New York
from instituting criminal proceedings against
him, said that generally a court will not enjoin
"the enforcement of a criminal statute even
though unconstitutional."2 However, the
Wooley Court pointed out that when there are
"exceptional circumstances" and a "clear show-
ing that an injunction is necessary to protect
federal rights," the courts are permitted to
enjoin state enforcement. 21
The Court noted that the three prosecutions
Mr. Maynard had already suffered through,
the surety of future prosecutions and the effect
such prosecutions had on the appellees' ability
to lead normal lives were exceptionally burden-
some circumstances involving deprivation of
federal rights. 30 Consequently, the Wooley
Court decided that the district court was not
limited to the granting of declaratory relief.31
The Wooley decision helped to clarify several
particularly difficult areas of the law. Ever
since Younger, the Supreme Court has been
extremely careful not to tip the balance of
federalism. 32 This cautious approach was his-
torically sound, since clearly the federal courts
were not meant to sit as capricious masters
over the state courts or legislatures.n Yet the
Steffel Court recognized "the paramount role
Congress has assigned to the federal courts to
27 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931
(1975).
295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935).





3 See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975);
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
33See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
protect constitutional rights." 34 Previously, the
Court had recognized federal court power to
issue declaratory judgments3s and grant pre-
liminary injunctions. However, it had ex-
pressly reserved its judgment on the advisability
of granting permanent injunctions against en-
forcement of state laws.37 In Wooley, the Court
finally decided that its Steffel-mandated role as
constitutional protector might require it (or
other federal courts) on occasion to prohibit
the effectuation of state statutes. 38
Interestingly, the Wooley Court stated that
there were exceptions to the general Spielman
bar against federal injunctions aimed at state
criminal laws, thereby intimating that it was
following clear precedent. Yet the Court failed
to cite any previous cases decided on this
ground. Thus, although it appears that Wooley
is the first case to be explicitly categorized as
an exception, the Court did not extensively
discuss its rationale or the substantiation of an
abstract principle .
3
Justice White in his dissent criticized the
majority for the rather vague rationale it used
to justify the granting of equitable relief.40
According to Justice White, the majority de-
parted from established case law without ex-
plaining why the case at hand merited different
consideration. The argument posited by Justice
White was that prior to the Supreme Court's
declaration that the New Hampshire statutes
were unconstitutional, the state officers arrest-
ing Mr. Maynard had only been doing their
duty; therefore, there had been no exceptional
circumstances. The majority, however, properly
focused not only on Maynard's past arrests,
but also on the possibility of his future arrest
and the disruptive effect such a threat would
have on his normal living habits.41
In support of the majority opinion, it should
be recognized that the federal courts have
exercised their constitutional power to declare
state statutes void since the nascent days of the
republic.42 A plantiff in federal court would
415 U.S. at 473.
35 Id. at 463.
36 422 U.S. at 930.
37 415 U.S. at 462.
38 97 S. Ct. at 1433.
" See generally id. at 1434.
40 Id. at 1437.
41 Id. at 1434.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). Defend-
ant was convicted for selling lottery tickets contrary




derive little benefit from the court's exercise of
this power if the federal court did not have
strong medicine to back up its decision. In the
Wooley case, Mr. Maynard had, within a two-
month period, gone to jail and faced revocation
of his driver's license. There could be no surety
that the state of New Hampshire would imme-
diately cease its prior arrest policy, 43 especially
in view of State v. Hoskin," a pre-Wooley case,
in which the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire upheld the identical license plate statute
struck down by the United States Supreme
Court in Wooley. By granting an injunction, the
Supreme Court of the United States removed
the element of uncertainty which underlies the
mere issuance of a declaratory judgment. In a
criminal justice system dedicated to ensuring
prior notice of what conduct will evoke penal
sanctions, the Wooley decision represents a step
forward.
The Court's decision to grant a federal in-
junction was grounded upon firm constitu-
tional principles. The Constitution, through
the tenth amendment, left all residual powers
not specifically delegated to the federal govern-
ment to the states.4 5 This broad grant of police
powers allows a state to legislate for the health,
morals, safety and well-being of its citizens.
However, the statutes enacted by each state
legislature must not conflict with the strictures
of the United States Constitution .46 When there
is a conflict, the Supreme Court of the United
States has power to declare the conflicting
statute unconstitutional.4 7 The Supreme Court
in Wooley exercised this option and declared
the New Hampshire license plate statute consti-
tutionally infirm. This ruling, in effect, pre-
cluded the State of New Hampshire from as-
serting that the aforementioned statute legiti-
mately furthered an allowable state interest.
When the Supreme Court declares a state stat-
ute unconstitutional, it is not withdrawing a
small portion from the nebulous mass known
as the states' plenary powers; rather, it is saying
that the particular statute in controversy does
not fit within that mass of powers at all. 48 Since
13 Nothing compels a state legislature to immedi-
ately erase statutes declared unconstitutional from
their books.
44 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972).
" U.S. CONST. amend. X.
41 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. at 394.47 Id. at 404.
4' The United States Supreme Court discussed this
the statute in Wooley was held to be outside the
scope of New Hampshire's power, 49 New
Hampshire cannot legitimately contend that it
has an interest in the enforcement of the stat-
ute. If New Hampshire has no valid interest in
enforcing the statute, then a federal injunction
prohibiting prosecutions under that statute
does not usurp any constitutional power from
New Hampshire's crime prevention arsenal.
CONSTITUTIONAL MERITS
The Supreme Court applied a two-tiered test
to determine whether Mr. Maynard was al-
lowed to cover the state motto on his license
plates. First, it decided whether his conduct
was entitled to first amendment protection.
Then, it measured the interest Maynard had
in exercising that first amendment freedom
against the countervailing interests of the state
in retaining the motto.
At the district court level the Maynards
claimed that the act of masking the motto was
protected by the first amendment because (1) it
was done to avoid making a required affirma-
tion and (2) it was "symbolic speech." 0 The
three-judge district court 5i accepted the May-
nards' "symbolic- speech" argument and did
not consider whether the first argument was
operative .52 The district court believed covering
the state motto communicated the Maynards'
strong disagreement with the motto message,
thus transforming the action into protected
"symbolic speech" within the purview of Tinker
v. Des Moines School District53 and Spence v.
point in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943). See text accompanying note 69.
49 97 S. Ct. at 1435.
50 The concept of "symbolic speech" is discussed
in detail in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). The O'Brien Court noted that it did not accept
the theory that a limitless variety of conduct could be
labeled "speech" just because a person engaging in
that conduct intended to express an idea. Id. at 376.
Instances where the Court held the activity of individ-
uals to be protected "symbolic speech" are Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
5! Because the plaintiffs sought an injunction
against a state statute on grounds of its unconstitu-
tionality, a three-judge district court was convened.
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1965). 406 F. Supp. at
1383.
52 Judge Bownes would have rested the decision
on both grounds. 406 F. Supp. at 1386 n. 9.
53 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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Washington.- In Tinker, the United States Su-
preme Court said that the wearing of black
armbands as a protest against war was closely
akin to "pure speech. ' 55 Since the wearing of
the armbands was divorced from actual or
potentially disruptive conduct, the school board
could not overcome the plaintiffs right to ex-
press freely his opinion.5 6 Appellant in Spence
engaged in a "form of communication," even
though he did not use spoken or written
words ,5 by displaying a peace symbol on the
American flag. The Supreme Court held that
this display, combined with the factual context
of the times (several days after the Kent State
shootings and the Cambodian invasion), was a
form of protected expression.5
8
In contrast, the Supreme Court, reviewing
Wooley on appeal,59 affirmed the district court
judgment, basing its decision on what it per-
ceived to be an unconstitutional requirement
of ideological affirmation and not on the "sym-
bolic speech" issue. 60 Both the majority 1 and
the dissent" noted that the Maynards' claim of
symbolic speech was undermined by their re-
quest for the issuance of a special license not
bearing the state motto. In contrast, appellants
in Tinker and Spence desired to convey affirma-
tively ideological messages by their actions.
Wearing a black armband or flying a flag
embossed with a peace symbol were activities
universally recognized as being content-laden.
The Maynards' request for a special license
suggested a greater desire not to display "Live
Free or Die," than a desire affirmatively to
disavow acceptance of the state motto. Yet the
Supreme Court asserted that the right to refuse
affirmation is as constitutionally protected as
the right to speak.' The landmark case cited
to support this proposition was West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette. ' In that
case, the State Board of Education ordered
that the flag salute become a regular part of
54 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
55 309 U.S. at 505.
56 Id. at 508.
7 418 U.S. at 409.58 Id. at 410.
59 Since a state statute had been struck down as
unconstitutional, the state had a right to direct appeal
to the United States Supreme Court.
60 97 S. Ct. at 1435.
61 Id. at 1434.
621 d. at 1438 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 1435.
64 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
the program of activities in the public schools.
All teachers and pupils were required by statute
to participate in the salute with a penalty of
expulsion for non-compliance. Appellees were
Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to salute the
flag for religious reasons. The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's ruling striking down
the statute. It was noted that school attendance
was not optional; therefore, the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses either had to flout state attendance re-
quirements or be subjected to participation in
an ideological affirmation that was repulsive to
their religious beliefs.
The Barnette Court said that government
censorship of speech is allowable only where
there is a showing of a "clear and present
danger." 65 The Court then stated: "It would
seem that involuntary affirmation could be
commanded only on even more immediate and
urgent grounds than silence. 66 The state of
West Virginia could not offer any reasons
which qualified as "immediate and urgent"
necessities for the continued operation of the
statute. As the Court noted, "[to sustain the
compulsory flag salute we are required to say
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individ-
ual's right to speak his own mind, left it open
to public authorities to compel him to utter
what is not in his mind.
67
The Barnette decision overruled Minersville
School District v. Gobitis,68 which had upheld a
similar flag salute statute. The Gobitis Court
had assumed the state had power to impose
flag saluting on children in public school. How-
ever, the Barnette Court found it unnecessary
to determine whether non-conformist belief
would exempt students from this duty, because
it held that the states do not have the power to
make the salute a legal duty.69
The majority in Wooley recognized that there
was a difference between the actions required
of an individual in Barnette and those in Wooley.
The flag salute necessitated an active verbal
affirmation of political belief, while displaying
a license plate was a purely passive act. How-
ever, Chief Justice Burger felt this was merely
a diffence in degree, not in kind.70 Display of
license plates on automobiles in New Hamp-
65 Id. at 633.
66 Id.67 Id. at 634.
- 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
69 319 U.S. at 638.
70 97 S. Ct. at 1435.
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shire, like school attendance in West Virginia,
was mandatory. 7' Thus, when the Maynards
drove their car in public, they were constantly
"an instrument for fostering public adherence
to an ideological point of view [they found]
unacceptable." 72 The New Hampshire statute
was seen as requiring the Maynards to use
their personal property as a "mobile billboard"
for the state's ideological message. 73
The Court's task was not completed after
merely identifying the Maynards' act as one
meriting first amendment protection. Follow-
ing the thrust of free speech cases since Schenk
v. United States,7 the Wooley Court evaluated
the countervailing interests which the state had
for maintaining "Live Free or Die" on all pas-
senger plates. The two interests advanced by
the state were that the display of the motto
facilitated the identification of passenger vehi-
cles and promoted appreciation of history, in-
dividualism, and state pride. 75 The district
court 76 directly applied the O'Brien77 test to the
facts before it and found that the balance
swung in favor of the Maynards' interests
rather than the state's. In O'Brien, the Court
held that even speech-related activity could be
controlled (1) if the governmental regulation is
within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment; (2) if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; (3) if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to suppression of
free expression; and (4) if the incidental restric-
tions on alleged first amendment freedoms are
no greater than essential for furtherance of
that interest.78
The Wooley District Court found the New
Hampshire statute failed the last two parts of
the test: (1) the governmental interest (having
people read the motto)7 9 was related to sup-
pression of free speech, and (2) even if the
purpose was neutral (i.e., for identification
purposes), the stifling effect of the statute was
71 See note l0supra.
72 97 S. Ct. at 1435.
7 Id.
74 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes first formu-
lated his famous "clear and present danger" test in
this case. Defendants were convicted of making anti-
draft circulars and the Supreme Court upheld the
convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917.
75 97 S. Ct. at 1436.
76 406 F. Supp. at 1388.
77 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
78 Id. at 377.
79 See text accompanying notes 88-89.
greater than essential for furtherance of the
state interest.
80
The Supreme Court, although not directly
referring to O'Brien,s1 analyzed the respective
interests of the Maynards and the state and
came up with the same result as the district
court had reached. The state's interest in offi-
cially communicating to others proper appreci-
ation of history and state pride was deemed by
the Supreme Court in Wooley not ideologically
neutral.8 2 The Court agreed that the state may
pursue such interests in many ways, "[h]owever,
where the State's interest is to disseminate an
ideology, no matter how acceptable to some,
such interest cannot outweigh an individual's
First Amendment right to avoid becoming the
courier for such message. 8 3 Like the district
court in Wooley, the Supreme Court rejected
the state's other argument-that the motto was
necessary for identification purposes-because
of the procedure used by the state to implement
that interest.
The Court's ruling on the constitutional mer-
its presents a potentially far-reaching doctrine.
Both the majority and Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent dealt with the question of whether
United States currency with "In God We Trust"
printed on it is constitutionally permissible.
The majority seemed to suggest that there was
a difference between money and license plates
in terms of public display time.8 4 Yet, that type
of analysis seems to undermine the "difference
of degree" rationale which the majority used
for extending Barnette's prohibition of active
verbal affirmation to Wooley's passive affirma-
tion .5
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, saw "the
logic of the Court's opinion lead[ing] to star-
tling ... and ... totally unacceptable results."
80 406 F. Supp. at 1388.
81 The Court said that it had to measure the
countervailing interests of the state and cited O'Brien
as an example of the prior use of this technique. 97
S. Ct. at 1436.
82 97 S. Ct. at 1436.
3 Id.
4 [W]e note that currency, which is passed from
hand to hand, differs in significant respects
from an automobile, which is readily associated
with its operator. Currency is generally carried
in a purse or pocket and need not be displayed
to the public. The bearer of currency is thus
not required to publicly advertise the National
Motto.
97 S. Ct. at 1436 n.15.
" See text accompanying note 70.
[Vol. 68
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
"I cannot imagine," he said, "that the statutes
. .. proscribing defacement of U.S. currency
impinge upon the First Amendment rights of
an atheist."'86 Justice Rehnquist was correct in
asserting that the logic of Wooley could find
permissible the removal of "In God We Trust"
from currency without penalty; however, why
he found the result "totally unacceptable," and
why the majority tried to distinguish license
plates from money is hard to explain. Perhaps
both sides were looking at the problem with
extreme biases. The governments of New
Hampshire and the United States have placed
"Live Free or Die" and "In God We Trust" on
license plates and currency for a reason. The
reason cannot be New Hampshire's claim that
it aided in identification of passenger cars: a
neutral slogan like "Scenic New Hampshire"
would have served the same purpose. 7 Simi-
larly, the United States could not claim that
the addition of the U.S. motto materially aided
detection of counterfeit currency. Rather, the
reason must be that the respective governments
chose to display these ideologically charged
mottoes for their intrinsic meaning. They are
clear statements of philosophical convictions.
The Wooley Court perceptively noted that the
New Hampshire statute effectively required
citizens to use their private property as "mobile
billboards" for the state's message8 Although
the vast majority of Americans may agree with
both New Hamsphire's and the United States'
mottos, as the Court said in Barnette, "[o]ne's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech . . . and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections."89 Thus, United States
statutes prohibiting currency defacement
should be held unconstitutional to the extent
that they restrict an individual from obscuring
"In God We Trust."
After declaring the New Hampshire statutes
substantively infirm,9" the Court noted that the
motto requirement was also procedurally de-
86 97 S. Ct. at 1439.
87 This slogan was printed on New Hampshire
plates prior to enactment of the "Live Free or Die"
requirement in 1969. In addition, the evidence
strongly suggested that the state plates generally
consist of two letters followed by four numbers, so
that they are easily identifiable without the motto.
88 See text accompanying note 73.
89 319 U.S. at 638.
90 97 S. Ct. at 1435.
fective because there were "reasonable alterna-
tives." The "reasonable alternative" doctrine
was substantially formulated in Schneider v.
State.91 In that case, a state statute which pro-
hibited the distribution of leaflets on city
streets, ostensibly to eliminate littering, was
struck down by the Court. The Supreme Court
stated: "We are of opinion that the purpose to
keep the streets clean and of good appearance
is insufficient to justify an ordinance which
prohibits a person rightfully on a public street
from handing literature to one willing to re-
ceive it."92 The Court then cited several differ-
ent alternatives which the city could have used
to prevent littering without stifling free speech.
For the next eleven years the "reasonable
alternative" doctrine remained relatively dor-
mant. Surprisingly, the same day the Court
revived and expanded the doctrine to include
commerical activity,9 3 it narrowed its applica-
tion in the free speech area. 4 In Feiner v. New
York, a man was arrested and convicted for
causing a public disturbance, which resulted
from an unpopular speech he had delivered to
a large crowd. The Supreme Court refused to
reverse the conviction, stating that the peti-
tioner was neither arrested nor convicted for
the making or the content of his speech-rather
it was the reaction which the speech engen-
dered. 95 The Court chose not to apply the
"reasonable alternative" test and failed to note
the options which were available to the local
police; for example, they could have tried to
calm the loud crowd or to protect the speaker.
Instead the police forced the speaker to refrain
from further speech.
Wooley seems to be an affirmation of the
principle established in Schneider that the State
may not broadly stifle first amendment free-
doms in order to facilitate routine state func-
tions when there are less burdensome alterna-
tives. Yet, it is difficult to determine how far
the present Court would be willing to go in
protecting speech, if it were presented with a
volatile situation like the one in Feiner. Both
Schneider and Wooley presented clear cases: the
Court could unhesitatingly proclaim the supe-
riority of speech interests over everyday admin-
91 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
92 Id. at 162.
9' Dean Milk v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
94 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
9 1 Id. at 320.
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istrative ones, since non-controversial alterna-
tives were available. However, it has been much
more hesitant to protect speech that is unpop-
ular and generates an unfavorable or undesir-
able response. It often seems as if its rationale
is that one can say whatever he wants and
receive first amendment protection, as long as
people either like what he says or do not
seriously listen to what he says.
Justice Rehnquist employed his own type of
"reasonable alternative" test in the dissent. He
claimed that the Maynards were perfectly free
to place bumper stickers on their car disavow-
ing affirmation of the state motto-as long as
they did not cover the motto. However, that
rationale is plainly refuted in recent Court
opinions. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,96 the Supreme Court dealt with an
argument made by the city of Miami which was
identical to Justice Rehnquist's argument. The
city argued that its "Right to Access" law, which
forced the area newspapers to publish rebut-
tals, did not restrict the papers from printing
anything they wanted. The Court said arguing
that the "statute does not amount to a restric-
tion of appellant's right to speak because 'the
statute in question here has not prevented the
Miami Herald from saying anything it wished'
begs the core question.""7 It was "[c]ompelling
editors or publishers to publish that which
",reason" tells them should not be published'
[which] is at issue in this case."9' Similarly in
Wooley, the question is not whether the May-
96 418 U.S. 241 (1974).971 Id. at 256.
98Id.
nards can somehow override the political state-
ment they are carrying, but whether they can
be forced to carry the statement at all. The
Supreme Court in Wooley, upholding first
amendment principles, answered in the nega-
tive.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Wooley represents a
wholesome desire to reaffirm the individual's
rights in a majoritarian society. The strong
support for the extension of Barnette, evi-
denced in Tornillo, Rowan v. Post Office Dep't99
and Wooley, reflects a concern for each individ-
ual, regardless of his political, philosophical,
or religious beliefs. In the past, the government
tried not only to proselytize the masses with
majoritarian ideologies, but also to force each
individual to participate in such activity. 00
Clearly the State has an interest in promoting
itself, and Wooley recognizes that right. How-
ever, Wooley prevents the government from
overextending its influence. Such a holding
faithfully adheres to the well-established prin-
ciples of the first amendment and raises the
hope that the Court will expand still further
the rights of individuals in relation to those of
the majority.
99 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). There the Court said:
"Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to
or view any unwanted communication, whatever its
merit; we see no basis for according the printed
word or pictures a different or more preferred status
"E.g., the forcing of children to salute the flag
in Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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